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Forests as landscapes and ecosystems provide both economic and environmental benefits. The 
transition towards a more sustainable society ought to actualize the importance several of these 
goods, forests are a natural carbon sink, a source of bioenergy as well as renewable building 
materials. As ecosystems forests are also key for biodiversity (Aggestam & Pülzl, 2018). Based 
on this, one might assume that policy relating to forests and forestry will be a relevant topic 
going forward. Forest policy is not a formal competence of the EU, yet the union has for a long 
time been engaged in forests both directly and indirectly. This makes it an interesting policy 
area to analyse and study. The European Green Deal (The Von der Leyen Commision’s 
environmental policy package that headlined the new commission’s first months) mentions 
forests in several aspects and stakes out the path for a new EU Forest Strategy to be 
implemented in 2021 (European Parliament, 2020). In anticipation of this, delving into past 
developments of integration on this area are useful to understand the future process. 
 
Previous research on European forest policy has painted a detailed picture of its emergence over 
time. However, studies on the area that focuses on the process of integration on the area are 
scarce. The studies that try to project its development are conflicting. Andersson (2007) and 
Bjärstig (2013), both studies rooted in neofunctionalist theory, claim that supranational 
integration is likely and project that forest policy might become included as a formal 
competence at some level. Meanwhile Edwards and Kleinschmit (2013) refute this, claiming 
that member states are most unwilling to cede authority. Instead suggesting that non-binding 
coordination is more likely. Theoretical perspectives on integration other than 
Neofunctionalism are lacking. The aim of this thesis work is to bring clarity into these differing 
perspectives and deepen understanding of the integration process on this area. The specific 
question of the study is: Who and what is driving integration in the forest policy area?  
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The study’s analytical framework is based on European integration theory, which aims to 
explain why countries coordinate (or why they might not). Using both Neofunctionalism and 
New Intergovernmentalism, with the aim of bringing two contrasting perspectives into the 
analysis. In Neofunctionalism there’s an innate belief that supranational integration is likely to 
increase over time, pushed onwards by spillover effects. New Intergovernmentalism on the 
other hand view integration as more controlled by states. With states being considered wary of 
transferring power to a supranational level, coordinative measures are seen as the most likely 
form of integration.  
 
The method is a qualitative document study, with a process tracing approach. The study is 
performed by analysing the original forestry strategy from 1998 and the new one from 2014 to 
assess changes over time. Equally important are the documents associated with the new Forest 
Strategy, as they offer insight into the process of drafting the strategy and the intentions of the 
various actors involved. The theories are employed to construct two sets of expectations on 
these documents and to create explanatory models in the analysis. The results of the study find 
no shifts towards a more supranational forest policy, rather the strategy relies on coordination. 
It is also found that the Council (and in extension the member states) seem to be fully in control 
of the process of shaping the new Forest Strategy, indicating a shift from the first strategy in 
1998 when the European Parliament very much instigated the inception of the strategy. The 
Parliament is now reduced to a secondary role, while the Commission seems to primarily adapt 
itself to the will of the member states. 
 
The first chapter is on previous research. It’s divided into two sections, the first on the historical 
emergence of the EUs role in forest related issues, the second section discusses the more recent 
research on integration of EU forest policies. Then aim and the specific research questions are 
presented. Afterwards the theories used in this work are presented in detail. Subsequently is the 
material and method section, where the material used is discussed before the method and the 
theoretical expectations are discussed. In the results section the findings from the material are 
presented as well as analysed. In the final section, the conclusions and implications of the 
findings are discussed. 
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2. Previous research 
 
This chapter is split into three parts. The first part discusses research on the development of 
forest policy within the EU. The second sector describes more recent research on where the 
policy areas is headed now. The final chapter addresses the identified research gap in the 
previous research. 
 
2.1 The Emergence and Development of EU Forest Policy 
 
Andersson (2007) describes the historical emergence of forest policy within the EU. It is not 
mentioned in the Treaty of Rome (EEC Treaty). Yet the Directorate Generale of Agriculture in 
a limited manner handled issues related to forests and after some time funding was allocated to 
forest related ends. In 1974 a proposal on a directive on common EU forest policy was rejected 
by the Council. Related proposals were rejected by the Council in both 1978 and 1983.  In 1986 
a new proposal was this time rejected by the European Parliament.  
 
Andersson (2007) then describes how the EUs fourth enlargement in 1995 once more actualized 
the topic of EU forest policy. All the countries joining in 1995; Sweden, Finland and Austria, 
had substantial forested areas and economically significant forestry industries. The European 
Parliament started to probe the possibilities of EU forestry policy. There was significant support 
among several member states (MS) for a truly common forestry policy. However, amid fears 
from other sectors that the inclusion of forestry would diverge attention and funding from their 
own sectors combined with disinterest from the new coming MS’s, this turned out to be a dead 
end. In 1996 the so-called Thomas report from the parliament proposed that the EU establish a 
forest strategy. Ultimately in 1998, the Commission enacted a non-binding Forest Strategy. 
Note that strategies are enacted directly by the Commission, as such strategies are not subject 
to the normal EU legislative procedures. 




Besides the Forestry Strategy (and its novel edition in 2014) the sole other document related 
specifically to forests is the Forest Action Plan from 2006 to 2011. It too is non-binding and 
based on voluntary cooperation. It is thought to have had very little effect on coordinating EU 
policy except by accommodating information sharing (Winkel et al, 2013). 
 
Outside of these two initiatives there’s a whole host of legislation affecting forests more 
indirectly. Winkel et al (2013) list these policy areas. Through the CAPs (Common Agricultural 
Policy) rural development (More correctly named European Agricultural Fund for Rural 
Development) various forestry projects are funded. Environmental policy in the form of policies 
on conservation, biodiversity and various environmental protections. Climate change policy 
primarily through land use policy which aims to address carbon emissions and storage. Energy 
Policy since forests are a key source of renewable energy. Lastly also trade and industry policy. 
 
To summarize we can see that there historically have been several efforts to create a common 
EU forest policy, yet all have failed. Nonetheless, over time there has been a growing number 
of policies rooted in other competences that effect forests. As far as documents that cover 
specifically forests and forestry the Forest Strategy is the sole one, which is nonbinding in 
nature and enacted by the Commission, is the sole one. 
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2.2 Explaining Integration in the Forestry Area: Heading Towards Supranationalism 
or Coordination?  
 
This second part delves into the research on how the forest policy area is developing within 
the EU and how integration on the area is understood. It finds conflicting images, with one 
side presenting the idea that forest policy is likely to become a formalized competence and 
thus receiving a more supranational nature. Supranational meaning in this context to delegate 
national authority to the European Union. The contrasting image is one of EU member states 
reluctant to cede any authority on forest issues to the EU, instead keener on collective 
coordination. 
 
Andersson (2007) research on events after the enactment of the Forestry Strategy in 1998 seems 
to suggest that further integration is plausible. Through an analysis of EU documents (Action 
Plans and Council statements, among others) the study interprets there to be a demand for 
further formalization of EU forest policy from member states and other actors as well.  She has 
also conducted a questionnaire sent to representatives from forest authorities in each member 
state. A plurality of respondents (one of from each member state) express a desire for a common 
EU forest policy, which the study interprets as a shift in attitudes since the negotiations 
concerning the first forestry strategy. She also interviewed Swedish non-government actors in 
the forest arena, both industry and environmental organisations. Amongst them a majority in 
favour of formalized EU forest policy was found. In conclusion the study argues that there is a 
shift among various actors (especially among what is termed as forest elites) towards supporting 
some form of EU competence on forest policy. It is argued that this is a result of 
institutionalisation among forest actors who find themselves partially forced by increasing EU 
authority on the area to get the area formalized to be able to influence the policy area. 
 
Building on Andersson (2007), Bjärstig (2012) interviewed actors in the Swedish forest sector 
to gauge their attitudes towards formalized integration of EU forest policy. The results find that 
the sector at large is positive towards such an integration, having confidence that they could 
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steer its development. Basing her study on Neofunctionalism, Bjärstig characterizes her 
findings as a sort of functional spillover in action. Hypothesising that previous EU decisions 
have forced actors to accept increased EU authority as a path to increase their own influence on 
the area. Further she argues that from a neofunctionalist perspective NGOs are likely to 
successfully create broader support for formalized EU forest policy by influencing 
policymakers. 
 
In “Towards a European forest policy - Conflicting courses “, Edwards and Kleinschmit (2013) 
discusses concurrent processes towards developing European forest policy. Some of them 
occurring outside the framework of the EU. A rivalling process is one through Forest Europe, 
an organization gathering 46 European countries. They analysed both public documents and 
interviewed government representatives in several EU member states. In contrast to Andersson 
(2007) they found that a majority of member states were worried about increased EU authority 
on the sector while a much smaller number welcomed more EU initiatives. Due to the strong 
desire among several actors for forests to remain a national competence, they foresee a higher 
likelihood for non-binding coordination rather than increased supranationalism. Possibly, they 
argue, this could even occur outside of the frame of the EU through Forest Europe. 
 
Aggestam & Pülzl (2018) have dissected how well the Forest Strategy from 2014 is integrated 
with other policy areas that directly affect forests. They carried out their analysis by grouping 
all policy documents and instruments in the EU relating to forests into different policy areas 
before analysing how well the objectives of the various areas matched with the Forest Strategy. 
They find a disconnect where the strategy omits several other areas of legislation that relate to 
forests. These findings however tell us very little of the process of integration of competences 
between member states and the supranational EU level.  
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2.3 Research Gap 
 
The review of previous research shows that there is a definitive lack of research in general on 
EUs forest policy area, especially so from a European integration perspective. Andersson 
(2007) tracked the initial emergence of forest policies on the European scene and the 
establishment of the first forest strategy. Since then, studies on the continued development of 
the policy sector have come to disparate conclusions. Andersson (2007) and Bjärstig (2012) 
seem to have found circumstances pointing towards a development that will lead to forest policy 
being formalized as a competence in the EU treaties. Edwards & Kleinschmit (2013) however 
describe a lack of interest among member states for transferring authority to the EU on forest 
policy, rather they expect coordinating solutions to be found. I have here identified an 
unresolved controversy on what actually drives integration on the area and how it is explained. 
With one side claiming that there are pressures acting that will result in deeper, formalized 
integration while the other side argues that member states are both unwilling to let this happen 
and capable of hindering it, instead seeking non-supranational coordinating solutions. 
 
Further of interest is the use of integration theories. Andersson (2007) and Bjärstig (2012) base 
their analysis solely on Neofunctionalist theory, not contrasting it with any other theories. While 
Edwards & Kleinschmit (2013) as stated offer a different perspective, arguing that coordination 
is more likely they do not relate these assumptions and thoughts to any integration theory. I 
argue that this lop-sidedness is flaw and there could be valuable insights gained by contrasting 
Neofunctionalism and including other perspectives.  
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3. Research Aim and Question 
 
With the previous research in mind, the thesis has two primary aims. First a descriptive one, as 
it will try to describe the development of the Forest Strategy implemented from 2014. But in a 
wider sense its intention is to delve into the mechanics of integration and decipher why 
countries may choose to deepen, or not to, their political cooperation. As stated, the research 
on forest politics from an integration perspective is centred on the emergence of the first 
Forestry Strategy. Due to this I believe the Forestry Strategy from 1998 to be a logical starting 
point for the further research conducted in this thesis work. The lack of theoretical diversity 
was also pointed out, the sole integration theory employed on the area was Neofunctionalism. 
I aim to complement that in this study, in order to gain a deeper understanding of what drives 
integration in this area and how it is explained.  
 
The specific question is: Who and what is driving integration in the forest policy area?  
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4. Integration Theory 
 
The purpose of integration theory is to try to explain why countries engage in collective 
coordination and why they cede authority from the national state to shared institutions, but also 
why they at times do not and why they might disintegrate (Schmitter, 2002). Integration theory 
can be understood as a sub-strand of international relations theory. The purpose of integration 
theory is closely aligned with my question, which is I find it to be a useful tool for my work. 
Especially as the previous research was anchored primarily in neofunctionalism, utilizing 
additional theories will be beneficial. In this section I will first discuss my choice of theories, 
before delving into their backgrounds and core ideas before reasoning about what their practical 
assumptions are. 
 
The two theories used for this thesis work are Neofunctionalism and New 
Intergovernmentalism, subsections of the two long term mainstream theories on European 
integration. The version of Neofunctionalism used in this essay will be the version constructed 
by Stone Sweet and Sandholtz (1997). Complementing and used to contrast it is New 
Intergovernmentalism developed by Bickenton et al (2015). In contrast to Moravcik's Liberal 
Intergovernmentalism I argue it’s better equipped to explain the daily machinations of the EU. 
Moravcik's theory is more focused on the grand bargains of the EU where treaties are 
negotiated. New Intergovernmentalism also focuses strictly on post-Maastricht developments 
within the union and its theoretical assumptions are adapted thereafter. I consider this a strength 
for this thesis since the events which this work aims to cover also occur post-Maastricht, this 
makes it more applicable than other versions of intergovernmentalism. 
 
Albeit developed some nearly 20 years earlier, Stone Sweet and Sandholtz’s neofunctionalism 
is also conceived in a post-Maastricht time frame. While they were unable to account for some 
more recent happenings within the EU (that Bickenton et al were able to incorporate) I still find 
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that their theory is useful for this work and their premises are applicable to the question which 




Haas was the first to use the term Neofunctionalism and is considered the original founder of 
the theory. It built on functionalist theory, which was mainly constructed as an alternative to 
realism. Functionalists criticized the idea that the self-interest of states was the primal driver of 
interaction between states, focusing instead on how states might cooperate to solve shared needs 
and interests (Bache et al, 2014). 
 
The core concept of neofunctionalism is the belief that international politics is not solely an 
arena where monolithic state meets but rather that the international arena allows for a myriad 
of different actors. With this comes the belief that non-state actors, organizations and even 
individuals are not limited to national politics and directly partake in international politics and 
do so in impactful ways. They also introduced the concept of spillover which they considered 
one of the main forces pushing for deeper integration. Spillover came in two forms, functional 
and political. The functional spillover is related to the shared European market. The 
intertwinement of the different sectors means that EU intervention in one sector creates a need 
for further integration into adjacent sectors. Political spillover is the concept that the creation 
of supranational institutions creates an environment where officials meet and consistently 
interact, creating a sort of shared logic that makes them more prone to encourage further 
integration leading to increasing pressures for integration over time (Bache et al, 2014). 
 
In their development of Neofunctionalism Stone Sweet and Sandholtz (1997) name 
“transnational exchange, supranational organization, and European Community (EC) rule-
making" as the three main drivers of European integration. Transnational exchange effect on 
integration is shortly described as these exchanges creating a need for shared regulation across 
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states, transnational actors are considered important as they themselves will argue for the 
necessity of these changes. Linked to this is the concept of functional spillover (introduced by 
earlier neofunctionalists), where increased shared regulating in one sector creates the need for 
shared rulemaking in adjacent sectors due to further market pressures. 
 
They also share the second form of spillover with previous neofunctionalists, political spillover. 
This spillover is more concerned with supranational organization and European rulemaking, 
once the supranational level is formed the actors in this arena will become institutionalized. 
Constant interaction between national and supranational actors is the social aspect of this, whilst 
a growing body of rules also creates a context which allows for further integration and makes 
exiting more difficult. Transnational groups may also directly influence the supranational 
decision making, such as corporations, interest groups etc. The Commission is generally 
considered independent and capable of pursuing agendas that the member states do not support 
(Stone Sweet and Sandholtz, 1997). 
 
Supranational decision making is thus not simply considered as an aggregate result of national 
governments negotiating but the process is greatly influenced by the supranational context, its 
norms and rules, that it operates within. Governments are rather seen as reactive, reacting to 
intertwined markets and a continuous process of integration. Although integration is seen as 
continuous it’s not regarded as a linear process, where the EU is getting more and more 
integrated over time. Integration might be non-existent and slow in some areas while 
progressing in other areas, depending on the transnational demands and market needs (Stone 
Sweet and Sandholtz, 1997). 
 
Let's summarize what neofunctionalism implies for integration: Integration is likely to increase 
over time, even if not in a linear way. Due to both forms of spillover, self-reinforcing patterns 
are formed. Especially what by what Stone Sweet and Sandholtz refer as institutionalization, 
supranational rules once set create momentum in of themselves. Where actors meet on the 
international level and start to socialize and create an elite pressure for reform. As such new 
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rules creates a self-reinforcing loop. The commission is especially viewed as an actor pursuing 
more supranational authority, as it in the process would strengthen itself. The Parliament too 
would probably be eager to follow this path, as it also would gain more influence if the EUs 
authority is strengthened. Member states on the other hand are mostly reactive, reacting to all 
these pressures. Interest groups are also noted for being able to directly influence decision 
making on the European level. 
 
4.2 New Intergovernmentalism 
 
The core concept of intergovernmentalism as an integration theory is that states are the primary 
actors of integration. The theory harks back to Stanley Hoffman who constructed the first 
intergovernmentalist theories as a response to neofunctionalism. He disagreed with the almost 
linear projection of ever deepening integration that neofunctionalists claimed. He also put states 
at the forefront, considering them the most important actors in the process of integration. The 
positions of states were conceived with national interests in mind, often with electoral 
considerations. Integration would only ensue when states agreed to and when their respective 
interests harmonized (Bache et al, 2014). 
 
A later rendition of Intergovernmentalism is Liberal Intergovernmentalism created by 
Moravscik (1993). As the name suggests it merges two theoretical strands. Building on 
Hoffman’s intergovernmentalism he added core parts from liberal international theory. Chiefly 
the idea about how policy preferences are formed on the national level as a sort of negotiation 
between different domestic interests. These policy preferences are what the member states have 
mind when they negotiate within the EU and thus in extension shape how integration proceeds. 
 
New Intergovernmentalism as presented by Bickenton et al (2015) is a further development of 
intergovernmentalist theory, both building on and contrasting Moravcik’s Liberal 
Intergovernmentalism. New Intergovernmentalism presents a somewhat different view of how 
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states conduct themselves. Previous editions of intergovernmentalism view the EU’s member 
states as selfish nation states ruthlessly pursuing their national interests Bickenton et al (2015) 
argue. They instead present an idea that nations identify themselves as member states and 
consistently work within the framework of the European Union to find solutions, preferably by 
consensus. 
 
New Intergovernmentalism also presents a different view on policy preferences compared to 
Moravcik’s theory where the positions of member states are shaped by national preferences. 
Instead, they portray a more dynamic situation where interest groups try to affect policy making 
both abroad and nationally, the various institutions also affect each other's viewpoints 
continuously (Bickenton et al, 2015). 
 
They reject neofunctionalism's idea that supranationalism is more likely over time due to market 
pressures and institutionalization. They acknowledge that EU integration is deepening, but not 
by expanding its supranational powers. Instead, coordination and close cooperation is preferred. 
When delegation of powers does occur, the preferred solution is to create “de novo bodies” that 
are independent of the commission, instead of ceding more power to the commission. Examples 
of this is the ECB and ESM. These de novo bodies often have a decision process where member 
states are more directly involved. This is a departure from the classical supranational integration 
where powers are ceded to the Commission and CJEU (Bickenton et al, 2015). 
 
They also argue that EU institutions do not inherently seek to increase supranational powers as 
assumed by neofunctionalist theory. The Commission and the CJEU might pursue more EU 
authority when they have the opportunity to do so, but often do not. The Commission in general 
is seen as highly adaptable to the will of the member states. The Parliament on the other hand 
seeks to increase its relative power, not always by increasing supranationalism but most often 
at the cost of other institutions. As such the Parliament is chiefly interested in making sure that 
the decision processes involve them (Bickenton et al, 2015). 




They believe that a driver for integration is that member states often find themselves unable to 
regulate sectors effectively domestically and thus try to solve these issues collectively within 
the EU. This does not, however, mean that they always agree on binding legislation, rather open 
coordination is preferred. Where consensus is found on the European stage, but actual 
legislation is drafted and implemented in the own state. This avoids one size fits all legislative 
solutions, while still allowing for collective problem solving. Another factor is the increasing 
intensity of Euroscepticism within the EU, rendering supranational and legally binding 
solutions politically unpalatable. Thus, coordination becomes more appealing to politicians in 
relation to other solutions (Bickenton et al, 2015). 
 
To summarize what New Intergovernmentalism means for the integration process: The core 
assumption is that the member states are likely to dictate the integration process. In the 
circumstance that the member states find a need for more cooperation on an area, they would 
pursue more coordination as they are wary of transferring power. In stark contrast to 
Neofunctionalism the Commission is not viewed as innately striving for increased EU authority 
but rather most probable to align itself alongside the member states. While the Parliament is 
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5. Material and Method 
 
This chapter is divided into three parts. The first part discusses them material chosen for the 
study, the second discusses the method employed while the third and last is dedicated to how 




In table 1, the material is presented with titles and brief descriptions. After this the choice of 
material is discussed in further depth. All the material used are documents from EU institutions. 
As this study aims to study specifically the EU and processes within it they are direct sources. 
 
One could claim that this narrow focus specifically on the forest strategies (and documents 
related directly to them) as an expression of the EUs position on forest politics is too narrow. 
Indeed, as stated in the previous research section there’s a considerable mass of other legislation 
that effect forests. This could mean that blindly focusing on the strategies leads to a 
misrepresentative portrayal of the actual process of integration on this area. While 
acknowledging this, I argue that it’s legitimate to focus on the forest strategies as they are the 
explicitly referenced to by EU institutions as the unions main documents on forest policy. 
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Table 1: Material 
 
Document title: Description 
Forestry Strategy for the European Union 
(1998) 
The first forest strategy in the EU, considered 
the basis for EUs involvement on forest 
issues. It is issued by the Commission. The 
document outlines the EUs goals for the 
policy area, with expectations placed on the 
Commission and member states alike. 
A new EU Forest Strategy: for forests and the 
forest-based sector (2013) 
The second forest strategy, in effect from 
2014. 
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING 
DOCUMENT Accompanying [… ] A new 
EU Forest Strategy: for forests and the forest-
based sector (2013). 
Working document with background 
information on the issues that the strategy 
relates to. Of most relevance for this thesis 
work is that it also details the process of 
developing the strategy 
A new EU Forest strategy: conclusions 
adopted by the Council (2014) 
This document contains the conclusions by 
the Council of the European Union on the 
strategy adopted by the Commission. 
European Parliament resolution of 28 April 
2015 on ‘A new EU Forest Strategy: for 
forests and the forest-based sector (2015) 
Resolution adopted by the European 
Parliament stating its opinions on the forest 
strategy, after it was published by the 
Commission. 
 
As stated in the previous research section, the forest strategies are enacted by the Commission 
and are considered the main documents on EU forest policy. The original Forestry Strategy 
from 1998 is viewed as the founding document that defines the EUs role on forest issues. In 
2014 the new Forest Strategy supplanted the original strategy. Except the subtle name change 
from Forestry - to Forest strategy they hold the same function (EU Commission, 2020).  
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Comparing these two strategies on EU forest policy allows for a comparison over time and to 
assess whether integration has advanced. This can be achieved by analysing how the roles of 
member states and the EU institutions are formulated.  Also, by seeing which policy objectives 
are staked out in each respective document? Have these objectives expanded in scope? 
 
The Commission’s working document is valuable as it allows for insight into the process of 
drafting the new strategy. How the process played out, which actors were involved and what 
role they played. Meanwhile the European Parliaments and Councils statements and 
conclusions are useful for assessing the positions and intentions of the respective institutions 
on the Strategy. The Parliaments resolution is adopted with simple majority, while Council 
require consensus among member states to adopt conclusions. 
 
The Commission communicated the strategy the 20th of September 2013 with implementation 
to be begin in 2014, the working document was published together with the strategy. It is 
important to note that the Parliament’s and Council’s statements were published after the 
strategy was adopted by the Commission. The Council published their statement the 19th of 
May 2014 which is about half a year after. Parliaments adopted their resolution 28th of April 
2015, which is more than a year and a half after the Commission communicated their strategy. 
As such these statements had no impact on the actual strategy, however they do show the 
attitudes of the respective institution towards the strategy and give clues on how influential they 
have been on the final outcome of the strategy.  
 
The documents are varied in form. The strategies are based on various objectives to be met, 
with accompanying texts. The Council's statement is written in the form of numbered 
statements, each with a smaller paragraph of text. The Parliament’s statement is composed 
entirely in the form of listed clauses, there is no free text. The Parliament’s document is 
especially expansive, including over 100 clauses.  The working document is split into various 
sections and is primarily free text. 
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5.2 Method  
 
The general type of method used is a qualitative document analysis. A qualitative approach is 
best suited for this thesis work due to the interpretative nature of its aim to decipher how the 
forest strategies relate to further integration on the forest policy area and also to interpret the 
accompanying documents and statements. The alternative would be to apply a quantitative 
document analysis. I however believe that simply counting key words to measure the stances 
of various institutions is too blunt an instrument. It does not allow for a holistic assessment of 
the respective documents nor for interpretation. Hence in the case of this study I believe a 
qualitative document analysis is the best tool to get nuanced insights into the question at hand 
(Esaiasson et al, 2017 s.211-216). 
 
For the comparison to be of value it’s critical that the analytical units are homogenous, so that 
the study as the idiom goes doesn’t compare apples to oranges (Esaissaon et al, 2017 s.92). As 
previously stated, the two forest strategies are identical in function, the latter has simply 
supplanted the previous edition. The Council’s statement and Parliament’s resolution are also 
comparable. While as explained under material they have some differences in form, they offer 
the same function and are the expression of the respective institutions on the Forest Strategy. 
As such I believe that the criteria of homogeneity is sufficiently fulfilled. 
 
The tool used to conduct the qualitative analysis is process tracing. Process tracing is as the 
name implies about tracing the process leading to a certain outcome. As such it focuses more 
on the causal chains and mechanisms rather than the outcome in itself. This technique is also 
useful for testing theories. By analysing how the actors involved behaved we can make more 
general assumptions on behaviour and decision processes in certain situations. This is where 
the theories come into play. The theories can be used to create assumptions on how the actors 
ought to behave and what the outcome ought to be. By process tracing one can then track a 
certain process and see whether it is possible to observe these hypotheses empirically and thus 
ascertain the theories assumptions (Esaiasson et al, 2015). 




To more extensively trace the process and thus get a more correct description it would be of 
value to include more material than the 5 documents used. Interviews for example could be of 
complementary value by providing first-hand accounts from individuals involved in the 
process. However due to the time constraints of this thesis work the decision to restrict the 
material to official documents made for a much more manageable sample. As such the method 
conducted in this thesis work is a more limited form of process tracing. 
 
Of critical importance when conducting a study is to ensure that there is a good level of validity 
and reliability. Validity is simply put about accurately measuring what the study claims to 
measure, while reliability is about ensuring that the results are repeatable (Esaiasson et al, 
2015). The qualitative method that I employ is interpretative in nature, which makes the need 
to reflect on these issues even more acute. As I processed the material in the results section I 
homed in on statements and sections that carried weight to my question. A great part of the 
documents were various statements where the institutions stressed the importance of forests and 
plenty of background information, these parts were mostly left out the results and analysis as I 
believe they had limited relevance on my question. Instead, I concentrated on statements that 
referred to action: who was involved were, what do they believe should be done and who should 
do it. As such I believe I faithfully captured how the respective institutions were involved and 
what their stances on integration of the policy area are. To achieve full transparency on how the 
analysis is conducted the next chapter will precise how the theories will be used to analyse the 
empirical findings. This transparency will allow for scrutiny of and increase the repeatability 
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5.3 Theoretical Expectations 
 
Under the theory section I outlined the implications of the respective theories on the topic at 
hand. Before conducting the results and analysis, these implications are here specified to what 
they might imply for the documents used as material in the form of two rivalling sets of 
expectations. These expectations will used to analyse the material.  
 
5.3.1 Neofunctionalism expectations:  
 
The first forest strategy can be seen as a vantage point for further and deeper integration on the 
area. Once the forestry strategy was established as a charter for forest related policies it creates 
a set platform where there are opportunities to make further decisions on forests, also forming 
an environment where actors both national and supranational consistently interact on these 
issues. This is what is termed as political spillover. The strategy is especially prone to increase 
in ambition since the Commission, which is portrayed as seeking ever deeper integration, has 
the power to singlehandedly adopt strategies. Member states, represented here through the 
Council’s statement, are likely to be more hesitant towards the strategy if the Commission 
strives for more integration than they find appropriate. The Parliament’s statement is likely to 
call for a strengthening of the EU’s authority on the policy issue and that it should take a wider 
approach, encompassing more goals and objectives. Since as discussed in the theory section, 
increasing EU powers gives the Parliament more influence. 
 
5.3.2 New Intergovernmentalism expectations: 
 
The New Forestry strategy is likely to call for more coordination and cooperation between 
member states without demands for legislative solutions that increase supranationalism. As 
discussed in the theory chapter this is the general stance of New Intergovermentalism, based on 
the belief that member states wield strong influence on the integration process. Member states 
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see the value in cooperation but believe supranational solutions are too inflexible for the 
individual state, additionally supranational integration is often unpopular domestically. They 
also state that the Commission is probable to align itself mostly alongside the member states. If 
this is correct, then in this case with a strategy that is entirely produced by the Commission it 
should mostly centre on coordinative solutions. Further, the Councils statement ought to be 
positive of the strategy if this is case. The European Parliament would be more inclined to make 
sure that it as an institution has the maximum amount of relative influence on the topic, rather 
than a shift in authority from member states to the supranational level. The Parliament is more 
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6. Results and Analysis 
 
The results section will be presented in four sections. The first three presenting the results in 
chronological order. First of is the Forestry Strategy from 1998, the role of this part is to act as 
point of reference to gauge what has changed come the second Strategy. The subsequent part is 
titled “The Second Strategy“, including the Working document and Forest Strategy 
communicated in 2013. Together they present how the process of drafting the strategy has gone 
and its outcome. Third, is the part called Institutional Responses, in this part both the Council’s 
statement and the Parliaments resolution on the Forest Strategy are discussed and compared. 
After these three parts is the analysis chapter. The first three parts present the material in detail, 
presenting vital parts and what is most crucial from the theoretical perspective. In the analysis 
chapter a more thorough analysis is conduct in relation to the theories and previous research. 
 
6.1 The Starting Point 
 
6.1.1 Forestry Strategy (1998) 
 
The first strategy, called the Forestry Strategy was enacted in 1998. The Commission motivates 
the strategy’s existence by referring to existing competences such as rural development, the 
common market and environmental protection. Its expressed aim was to promote the forestry 
industry while also taking in mind other interests such as environmental protection, 
biodiversity, social benefits among others. It highlights forests role as a source of 
environmentally beneficial resources and promotes sustainable forestry, connected to 
sustainability is the aim to divert EU research grants focused on environmentally friendly 
forestry combined with production. Another key goal is to facilitate increased information 
sharing between member states. The Standing Forestry Committee (The committee consists of 
one of one representative from each member state) is granted a prominent role as a platform for 
discussion on forest policy between the Commission and the member states, with the hopes that 
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this will increase coordination. All things considered the strategy also clearly states that member 
states are ultimately responsible for forest policy and national forest plans. 
 
6.2 The Second Strategy  
 
6.2.1 Working Document (2013) 
 
The Working document acts as a logical starting point to analyse the process. As discussed in 
the material chapter, the working document was published together with the Forest Strategy by 
the Commission and provides background information on what led to the strategy and how it 
was produced. My main conclusion from the working document is that member states seem to 
be involved in every step of the process as parts of the Standing Forestry Committee and in a 
working group which prepared the strategy. While on the other hand, the Parliament seems to 
be entirely excluded from the process.  
 
The Standing Forestry Committee (Which as stated in the previous chapter is composed only 
by representatives of the member states) played a key role in the development of the strategy, 
discussing it in both 2010 and 2011. Additionally, a working group described as “ad-hoc” under 
the Standing Forestry Committee with representatives from the Commission, member states 
and interest holders such as forest industry and owners, environmental groups is accredited for 
their contribution to the work by drafting a report on a new strategy in 2012. The report was 
then discussed in a workshop with member states and stakeholders and forwarded with approval 
from the Standing Forest Committee to the Commission.  
 
Note in this passage under the headline “1.3. Consultation with member states and 
stakeholders” (Page 9) how the EP is completely left out. “The new Communication on a Forest 
Strategy builds on a very close and extensive consultation process with both member states and 
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stakeholders during the preparatory phase”. Parliament is not mentioned at all, stakeholders 
referring in this context to industry and various interests' groups. 
 
6.2.1 Forest Strategy (2014) 
 
After having reviewed the process leading up to the strategy, I move on the actual document 
itself the 2014 Forest Strategy. The Rural Development funds are a vocal point of the strategy. 
About 90% of the EU financing of forest related ends come through Rural Development. 
Commission and Member states alike hope to steer money towards forest ends to promote the 
sector and increase its sustainability. Another goal is to coordinate research done on the these 
topics throughout the union. Looking beyond Rural Development, The Commission will create 
criteria for sustainable forest management. Member States should for example increase forests’ 
use for climate mitigation and create value for the ecosystem services forests provide, while the 
commission will oversee their progress. Just like in the previous strategy, information sharing 
is highlighted. In this new edition Member states and the Commission have the objective of 
creating a common information sharing system. It’s a shared responsibility as Member states 
are tasked with making more information available, while the Commission will facilitate 
sharing. One of the core concepts promoted is that EU policy that effect forests need to be 
coherent and promote synergies. 
 
In conclusion the strategy mostly suggests that Member States are responsible for reaching the 
various objectives, the Commission’s role is primarily about monitoring progress and 
promoting coordination. The more “supranational” role the Commission has is on the Rural 
Development funds, however these are administered nationally and thus Member states share 
responsibility here as well. There are no objectives about creating EU legislation. In substance 
this edition shares much of the same topics as the first one; information sharing and research. 
The second strategy puts a larger focus on the environment and sustainability.  
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With this in mind, I believe that this second strategy does not show any drifts towards increased 
supranationalism. It is mostly an update to keep its objectives up to date, while ambitions have 
grown on certain areas such as sustainability. As such it refutes the Neofunctionalist projection 
that the second edition ought to grow in scope and lean towards more supranational solutions. 
The New Intergovernmentalist expectation was for coordination to increase. Coordinative 
objectives are indeed the key part of the strategy,  
 
6.3 Institutional Responses 
 
Starting with the Council’s response as they published their response the earliest, on the 19th of 
May 2014. The Councils statement is very welcoming of the strategy, urging for it to be 
implemented by the Commission and Member states alike. Which can be seen from the 
following quotes from three different clauses: “9. WELCOMES the Communication from the 
Commission…” (s.3), “10. ENDORSES in general the EU Forest Strategy…” (s.4), “29 
INVITES the Commission and Member States to implement the EU Forest Strategy…” (s.9) 
 
They also state that while the EU has policies related to forests it is still a national competence 
and all policies on forests should respect the principle of subsidiarity. Other decisions and 
policies concerning forests should align with the intention and aims of the Forest Strategy. They 
complement the strategy for its increased emphasis on more coordination and strengthen that 
this is a key priority for them. The working document previously showed how the member 
states were directly involved in the process leading up to the publishing of the forest strategy. 
That the Council is so welcoming of the strategy is a sign that their concerns and intentions 
were heeded by the Commissions. I argue that this is a confirmation of the New 
Intergovernmentalist assumption that the commission will adapt itself to the Member states’ 
will. Neofunctionalism portrays member states as reactive, forced to adapt by pressures on 
further integration. These findings on the contrary seem to suggest that the Member states are 
very much in charge and able to dictate the process. 




Roughly a year later, on the 28th of April 2015, the Parliament agreed on a resolution as a 
response to the strategy. The resolution clearly states that the EU should not expand its 
authority and try to create a common forestry policy. This can clearly be seen in this clause: 
“4.  Stresses in this connection that any attempt to make forestry a matter of EU policy should 
be resisted and that the sector’s local and regional basis and the competence of the Member 
States in this area must be respected while seeking coherence between the respective 
competences of the EU and the Member States“  
 
The resolution is however welcoming of the strategy and expresses a belief that it’s a very 
important and needed document. They stress that the EU has an important role to play by 
coordinating and ushering forth change in areas such as information sharing and promoting 
sustainable forest management among other things and are supportive of the measures 
suggested in the strategy to achieve this. Also highlight the need to make sure that EU 
policies stemming from other competences but still affect forests are aligned with the strategy. 
They also believe that several key things are omitted in the strategy. For example, labour 
conditions of those working in the forestry industry, gender equality and promoting the role of 
women in the industry. 
 
The working document gave the impression that the Parliament was left out of the process 
leading up to the new strategy, the resolution confirms this as it expresses dismay that they 
were unable to voice their opinions until after the strategy was publicly communicated by the 
Commission with implementation already under way. This is clearly inferred in the two 
following clauses:  
“99.  Stresses that the implementation of the EU’s forest strategy should be a multiannual 
coordinated process in which the views of Parliament should be taken into account and that 
the strategy should be implemented efficiently, coherently and with minimal red tape; 
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100.  Regrets that the implementation process has partly begun before Parliament has adopted 
its position, and considers that this is not in line with the aim of better coordination of forest-
related policies as stated by the Commission in its Strategy text” 
 
It is a challenge to come to a definitive conclusion whether the Parliament’s resolution supports 
either theory over the other. The New Intergovermentalism expectation was that the parliament 
is most interested in the process and its relative influence, which was confirmed with the 
Parliament’s disappointment on their lack of influence. One might however argue that this is a 
extreme case, as the Parliament seems entirely side-lined and not just worried about relative 
power. Regardless of theoretical outlook one might logically assume this would be a cause of 
frustration. Meanwhile the Neofunctionalist expectation was that the Parliament would seek 
greater EU authority. In part this is confirmed as the resolution point out several areas which 
Parliament wished the strategy would include. However, the resolution also clearly states that 
a common, supranational Forest Policy is undesirable which shows that the parliament does not 
inherently seek increased supranationalism. 
 
The review of the Council’s and Parliament’s response shows that in substance they mostly 
agree. The Council fully supports the strategy while the Parliament asks for a more ambitious 
strategy in some regards, but both are in general positive of the strategy. What the two responses 
however also offer us an insight into is the two role they’ve both played in drafting the strategy, 
the Parliament’s resolution state their exclusion while the very positive response of the Council 




When it comes shifts towards supranationalism, they seem non-existent. Both the strategy itself, 
the statements from Council and Parliament a like explicitly state that forest policy is a national 
competence and ought to remain so. As such it can ascertained that no shift towards 
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supranational solutions are desired nor occurring. In contrast, they all also express the desire 
for further coordination on various issues. I argue this confirms part of the New 
Intergovernmentalist hypothesis that argues that coordination is the most likely solution of 
issues as it is preferred by member states. The Neofunctionalist might argue the lack of 
supranational integration is due to lack of markets pressures demanding increased integration. 
However, I do believe it’s a rebuke of Andersson’s (2007) and Bjärstig’s (2012) claims that the 
demand for common and / or formalized forest policy was growing among member states and 
NGO actors. My findings are much more in line with Edwards and Kleinschmit (2013) who 
found that member states are wary of ceding authority to the EU and instead project 
coordinative measures on forest policy. 
 
Andersson (2007) details the impactful role the parliament had in the development of the first 
strategy. The parliament had probed the potential for common EU forest policies and ultimately 
it was their Thomas report from 1995 that proposed an EU forestry strategy and in 1997 a 
resolution was approved in the parliament that recommended the Commission to enact a 
strategy. Come the second edition of the strategy the results find that they have been 
sidestepped, not consulted until after the strategy was already in implementation. Both the 
working document and the Parliament’s resolution confirm this. Meanwhile the member states 
seem firmly in control of the process, active both in the drafting of the strategy and in the end 
very content with the final strategy. The working document described how member states were 
actively involved during the entire prelude to the publishing of the document. Additionally, the 
Council’s statement on the strategy was very appreciate of the strategy which suggests that their 
wished were heeded by the Commission. This is also a clue of how to judge the Commission’s 
actions. I believe it suggests that New Intergovernmentalism expectations are more accurate, as 
they suggest that the Commission is adaptable to the intentions of the Member States while 
Neofunctionalism outlines the Commission as an actor constantly seeking further integration. 
If the Commission had been pushing towards integration and acted autonomously, the response 
from the member states ought to have been more hesitant. 
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It is possible that what we discern here is a result of the fact that strategies are adopted by the 
Commission alone, not through the EUs legislative procedures, and importantly that it’s not 
legally binding. So even though the Commission can include any ambitions and goals they 
might please, it is reliant on member states agreeing with the strategy’s intentions and 
subsequently following through the strategies domestically for the document to have any effect. 
Meanwhile as the Parliament’s powers are restricted to issuing their opinions on the contents 
of strategy, they might appear redundant. As such the Commission is incentivized to focus on 
the requests of the member states and include them in the process.  
 





To conclude, no traces of a change towards further supranational integration is found in the 
material used, instead increased coordination appears to be the preferred path. This rebuked 
some of the previous research that predicted increasing formalization of forest policy. 
Concerning the roles of the institutions, it seems that the Member States are the ones in control 
of the integration process on the area, with the Commission adapting to their wishes and 
Parliament mostly sidelined.  It is also been remarked that perhaps these findings are a result of 
the peculiar circumstances of EU strategies, as they are not part of the EU legislative procedures 
and are dependent on Member States following them through.  
 
Let’s summarize the conclusions on the two theories used in the thesis work. As we analyze the 
two sets of expectations, it is apparent that the set based on New Intergovernmentalism much 
more closely mirrored what was found in the material than was expected from the 
Neofunctionalism perspective. Both in how the actors behaved and the predicted outcome in 
the strategy. Throughout this study it has been argued that the lack of theoretical diversity in 
the previous research made for a flaw. I argue that the inclusion of New Intergovernmentalism 
made for a valuable addition that brought some of the conclusions from the previous research 
into question. Especially the projections of increasing integration that the previous research by 
Andersson (2007) and Bjärstig (2012) had made based on Neofunctionalist grounds. In a wider 
sense, the findings indicate that perhaps New Intergovernmentalism is more well-suited to 
project current developments within the union. At least under these particular circumstances, 
when analyzing a policy area where the EU lacks a formal competence New 
Intergovernmentalism seems more apt. 
 
Ultimately, how does this is all answer the research question: who and what is driving 
integration on the forest policy area? I have tried to answer this question by using integration 
theories to analyze the material. As has been previously discussed, the results find that member 
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states appear to have close control of the integration process on the area. Driven on by what is 
a perceived need for cooperation, but hesitant to allow supranational integration, they instead 
turn to coordination. Meanwhile the Commission follows along with the will of member states 
and the Parliament is mostly sidelined.  
 
Looking ahead for areas of further research, as briefly mentioned in the introduction a new 
forest strategy is in the pipeline to be published soon. Perhaps this will allow for further analysis 
on what has happened on the area since the second strategy. One could also pursue a more all-
encompassing study that includes all the EU policies on the forest area to assess the integration 
occurring. Alternatively, to make a more encompassing study, one could conduct a more 
thorough process tracing method which would include more material, for example interviews. 
This could offer even more detailed insights from actors involved in the integration process. 
Leaving forest politics behind, one could also employ the comparative use of the two integration 
theories used in this work on other policy areas to test if the conclusions drawn in this study 
also are applicable to other circumstances. 
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